Deferred Prosecution Agreement In Handling Coporate Corruption : A Comparative Study Of Implementation In The United States and United Kingdom and Its Relevance For State Loss Recovery In Indonesia

Abstract

Corporate corruption causes massive state financial losses and has systemic impacts on the national economy. Conventional prosecution mechanisms often cannot maximize state asset recovery while ensuring sustainable corporate governance reform. A Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) is a legal instrument that suspends prosecution against a corporation under specific conditions, including paying financial penalties, restoring losses, and implementing compliance programs. This research analyzes the legal framework and practical implementation of DPAs in handling corporate corruption in the United States and the United Kingdom, while evaluating their relevance and potential adaptation into Indonesia's legal system. Using a normative legal research method with a comparative approach, this study finds that DPAs in both jurisdictions have maximized state loss recovery, encouraged corporate cooperation, and prevented the negative collateral consequences of full prosecution. This research concludes that Indonesia must establish a comprehensive legislative foundation for DPA implementation, while upholding the principles of legal certainty, restorative justice, and public accountability.