Finding New Regional Mandalas: Indonesia Maritime Strategy Between India And China

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Abstract

This paper aims to analyse Indonesia’s dilemmas and prospects in engaging maritime strategic partner between China and India while pursuing its maritime reorientation. The expanding presence of China in Indian Ocean and its aggressiveness in maritime territorial dispute in East Asia has triggered India to transform Rao’s “Look East policy” to Modi’s “Act East policy”. Modi’s ambitious foreign policy increased eastward focus and his commitment in pursuing economic growth has been combined with India’s strategy in balancing against China’s Silk Road strategy. Both emerging powers, China and India, see Indonesia potential as strategic maritime partner in their strategic vision. Utilizing New Maritime Silk Road strategy or One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative in 2013, China engages ASEAN, including Indonesia, in infrastructure construction mega-project to enhance connectivity. While India, began in 1996 as dialogue partner in ASEAN Regional Partner (ARF), gets more involved in as ASEAN partner by joining ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+) in 2010 and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) in 2015. India and Indonesia have shared the common view of culture, colonial history, and political sovereignty, economic self-sufficiency, and independent foreign policy. They have been also originated from the same ancient polity that habituate them to cooperate even under anarchy situation. However, this mandala-inspired cultural legacy would also drive them toward potential conflict as the two countries try to structure their spatial process centripetally using maritime strategy. In this regards, the paper will also discuss the continuity and dissonance of maritime perspective in Indonesia and India experience. Jakarta’s will to strengthen its maritime posture marks its leitmotif to play its role as center within Southeast Asia mandala will be contested by India and China strategic interests in the sea. In the cultural memory of region, exerting power on the sea and ownership of huge armada symbolically marks and legitimates a country’s supremacy within heterarchy or regional hierarchy that tends to be equal. Using both contemporary and classical literature, this research intends to reveal how the contending emerging powers seek to aspire regional leadership using maritime tradition. While embarking from leadership-generational change and historical experience, this paper will shed the light why maritime strategy acts as guiding principles for national security in the global geopolitical shift and regional geo-strategy.

Keywords: mandala, maritime orientation, heterarchy, dissonance
Abstrak


Memanfaatkan strategi baru jalur Sutera Maritim atau One Belt One Road (OBOR) tahun 2013, China mengajak ASEAN, termasuk Indonesia, dalam konstruksi infrastruktur mega proyek untuk meningkatkan konektivitas. Sementara India, sejak tahun 1996 telah menjadi mitra dialog dalam ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) dan semakin terlibat sebagai mitra dengan bergabung dalam ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+) pada 2010 dan Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) pada 2015. India dan Indonesia telah berbagi pandangan yang sama dalam hal budaya, sejarah kolonial, politik kedauplan, kemandirian ekonomi, dan kemeredekan kebijakan luar negeri. Kedua negara juga berasal dari nenek moyang yang memiliki tata kelola pemerintahan yang sama sehingga membuat mereka terbiasa bekerjasama dalam situasi anarki. Hanya saja, warisan budaya Mandala dapat pula mendorong mereka pada potensi konflik sebagaimana dua negara berupaya menyusun proses spasial secara terpusat menggunakan strategi maritim. Dalam kasus ini, paper ini juga akan mendiskusikan kelanjutan dan disonansi atas perspektif maritim yang menjadi pengalaman Indonesia dan India. Jakarta juga akan menguatkkan postur maritimnya sebagai leitmotif untuk memainkan peranannya sebagai pusat dalam Asia Tenggara dimana Mandala akan dikontestasikan oleh India dan China terkait kepentingan strategis mereka di laut. Paper ini akan memberikan pemahaman mengapa strategi maritim bertindak sebagai prinsip-prinsip pengarah bagi keamanan nasional dalam pergeseran geopolitik dan geostrategi regional.

Kata kunci: Mandala, orientasi maritim, heterarchy, dissonansi
Introduction

Indonesia’s cross-road position in the Indo-Pacific region has strategic significance for geostrategic global forces. In the Pacific Century, Indonesia's position became very strategic because it is home to three Sea Line of Communications (SLOCs) and five of the world’s seven choke points (the Malacca Strait, the Singapore Strait, the Sunda Strait, the Lombok Strait, the Ombai-Wetar Strait). Not only does this position make Indonesia as the busiest point for trade but also as the arena of the great powers struggles, including two growing forces, India and China. If India projects its influence into the South China Sea through Indochina, China does the same thing by expanding its power to Indian Ocean through Myanmar. In their strategic vision, Indonesia has potential as a maritime partner positioning Indonesia at the center of geostrategic interests.

Not only does this position make Indonesia as the busiest point for trade but also as the arena of the great powers struggles, including two growing forces, India and China. If India projects its influence into the South China Sea through Indochina, China does the same thing by expanding its power to Indian Ocean through Myanmar. In their strategic vision, Indonesia has potential as a maritime partner positioning Indonesia at the center of geostrategic interests.

This two power projection raises the potential for instability in the region as a result of two new regional mandalas, twin power schemes of new 21st century involving China and India. Power projection clash occurs because India and China developed a centripetal policy that eventually gave rise to patronage under anarchy conditions. These two countries became two countries of civilization thanks to the culture and its contribution to the world civilization and both possessed nuclear weapons and developed its marine powers (Dellios, 2003b). They also share the common ideals to be new mandalas at the time, as well as they were home to ancient kingdoms that apply similar polities.

The practice of ancient India’s mandala was documented in Chanakya’s Arthasastra (or Kautilya’s). Chanakya, was at that time the Chief Minister of the Mauryan Empire, recorded the practices of this polity. Interestingly, in ancient India, the political mandala (statal circle) is more to be secular rather than a sacred one. Arthasastra also considered as a secular work (Dellios, 2003). China, meanwhile, also practiced a form of mandala polity at the height of the Middle Kingdom (Dellios, 2003b).

This study discusses the use of mandala to analyse how Asian powers transforms regional political landscape. Despite global power is still currently under US shadow, Indonesia’s geographical proximity to two new emerging power has made it anticipate their maritime maneuvers. To this end, this paper aim to answer how Indonesia
responds to India and China maritime maneuvers.

Mandala Traditional Geopolitics and Modern Geopolitics

In examining the political landscape of Indonesia and Asia, I use the concept of mandala as an alternative tool in analyzing foreign and defence policy of Indonesia which is dominated by Javanese view (Sebastian and Lanti, 2010: 150) and as well as Asian regional security that still inherits the ancient cultural memory of ancient China and India. Mandala, meaning circle in Sanskrit, is a spiritual diagram that is the reification of cosmos (Dellios, 2003). Despite its mystical meaning, the mandala is also a geopolitical expression to describe the inter-power relationships in ancient Indian and later Hindu-Buddhist periods of Southeast Asia. Mandala features also appeared in tributary system without administrative integration: as a circle of states, it is defined by the center, and not by its territory. Despite its roots in the Indian political discourse (Kautilya’s Raj Mandala) and the China’s mandala formation (at the apex of the Middle Kingdom dynasty), this concept has been modified to accommodate the 21st century geopolitical conditions. Higham (1989: 240) defines mandala as “the politics of charismatic center, with its attraction of deference and obligation from other power centers through a demonstrated ability to win allies and overtake enemies”.

As a matter of fact, mandala is created to structure the spatial process centripetally, towards the center. But unlike the rigid radial polity structures, concentrating power, and creating hierarchies, mandala is built to accommodate heterarchy: dispersed authority in satellite areas. Acharya and Buzan (2010: 228) interpret the mandala as polities without formal territorial sovereignty and practices symbolic and ritualistic authority. Chong (2010: 141) argues that mandala offers a radical potential for interpreting International Relations (IR) in different sense of Westphalian sovereignty. Other names for this concept are “galactic polity” (Tambiah), “theater state” (Geertz), and “solar polity” (Lieberman, 2003).

In traditional polity like pre-colonial Southeast Asia, the three properties contained in the mandala are: center, symmetry, and cardinal points (Tambiah, 2003). The first property, center, is the translation of cakravartin, the king’s entity which shines outward and represents the divine element. The center
is said to have personal and devotional power, not institutional. This power is not derived from conquest (albeit military force is the consequence), but from the leader's ability to tap into “cosmic power” with virtuous forces called “devaraja” (king of gods) in Hindu terms or “dharmaraja” in Buddhist terms. The second property, symmetry, is believed to be dynamic depending on the contextual situation and needs of mandala. The center should read the situation and adjust the strategy to keep the order and security within the mandala. The third property, cardinal points, which means the points that can affect how symmetry can be defined, maintained, and reconfigured. In pre-modern Southeast Asia, the two cardinal points are trade and security that play an important role in shaping and reconfiguring the regional political landscape.

As a concept, mandala is both sacred and secular. In the internal circle it becomes a powerful spiritual center for domestic resilience, while on the outside it is powerful in managing relationships for external protection. The power gained by the center is the power of God. Thus, the mandala affinities of state are a network of loyalties. Interestingly, however, in India and China practices, the concept of purely secular. In India, the political mandala, the statal circle, was secular affair of the territorial state as in China the Middle Kingdom implements a tributary system based on cultural superiority (Dellios, 2003).

Applying the concept or theory of non-Western International Relations such as mandala or mandala anarchy culture requires the transformation from hard theory to soft theory. Acharya and Buzan (2010) mapping resources of soft theories in four categories: 1) Classical Asian tradition or local religious, political, or military classical thinking such as Confucius, Kautilya, or Sun Tzu as Western International Relations Theory (IRT) drew inspiration from ancient Western thoughts of Thucydides, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Kant, and others. 2) Thoughts or approach of foreign policy of state leaders as the main source of formulating theory. Like Nehru, Mao, Aung San, Soekarno, Soeharto and other key foreign policy makers. 3) The third type has been done by most Asian scholars: using western HI theory to be questioned and evaluated for its relevance in analysis by retrieving data from local/regional experience. 4) This last type, could be an alternative breakthrough, focuses on assessing the events and experiences of
Asia through local/regional data mining, then formulating concepts as tool for general pattern of analysis in International Relations while placing Asia in a larger international system and comparing it with other world.

In addition to the mandala concept rooted in Asian knowledge stocks, this paper also uses an alternative framework in IRT using Javanese thought framework. From the standpoint of Java’s ontology and epistemology, power has different dimension to power from those of Western point of view. According to Javanese, ontologically, anarchy and its derivative concepts such as the balance of power do not exist. While epistemologically, for Javanese thought, power is concrete, homogeneous and transcends the boundaries of morality. The West also believes that international anarchy is natural condition within international system, and the extent of power depends on the accumulation of matter and its use. These differences on the level of epistemology and ontology have logical consequences on the foreign policy characteristics of Javanese leaders.

**Geopolitics and Geostrategy**

If geography is understood as physical reality, then geopolitics contains human factor in geography: geographic distribution of resources centers and communications lines which assign values to locations according to their strategic importance. While geostrategy is the geographic direction of a state’s foreign policy. It relates to how a state concentrates its efforts through projection of military power and directs its diplomatic activity (Grygiel, 2006: 22). For Grygiel, geopolitics is not as constant as geography, it reflects the changing geographic distribution of routes and natural and economic resources. Geostrategy of a country is not always due to geographical or geopolitical considerations, but can be ideologically motivated, interest groups, or merely the whim of its leaders. The challenge for strategists is that geostrategy does not necessarily reflect geopolitics

Geopolitics is determined by two variables: communication lines or routes and resources centers. The first variable is determined by the interaction between technology and geography. Communications line or route has economic and political significance (i.e. for the projection of power and access to resource centers). While the route is determined by three parameters: the discovery and creation of new routes, the invention of transportation technology, and
changes in resource location. In short, the route is not just about geography, but also human factors. The second variable, resources center, is determined by the mastery of natural and economic resources. Natural resources are geological wealth based on territory such as oil, water, coal, tin, while economic resources are human creations in the form of industrial goods such as machinery, steel and manufactured goods.

Geostrategy is defined by geographical focus or location where the state directs its power. According to Rogers and Simon (2010) geostrategy is characterized by the presence of political and extensive military presence and requires a network of alliances with great powers that share common interests or with linchpin state as lesser power located in perceived important location. They criticise that geostrategy was in the past built from colonialism so that geostrategy is nothing but a form of imperialism. However, not all geostrategy is imperialism. It can be concluded that geostrategy is none other than exercising hard power. Herein lies the difference between traditional geostrategy and mandala geostrategy in the matter of exercising power. The former relies heavily on hard power, while the latter is more on soft power.

**The Javanese Concept of Power**

To give a demarcation line between non-Western thought and Western thought, the author will distinguish the concept of Javanese power and its difference to the concept of Western power. Anderson (2006: 21-23) argues that there are at least four major differences between the concept of Western and Javanese power. *First*, according to Western thinkers, power is abstract, as does the concept of authority or legitimacy. Power can only be judged by its consequences, in the context of patterns of social interaction such as obedience, order or expectations against others. As for the Javanese thinkers, power is concrete/real and is not a theoretical proposition. Power is an independent entity and is independent of something else and it exists in every aspect of the universe: in rocks, trees, fire, and so on.

*Second*, sources of power, in Western thought, are heterogeneous. Power sources can come from wealth, social status, office positions, organizations, weapons, populations, and so on. Meanwhile, according to Javanese thought, Power is homogeneous. The source of power comes from Power itself, not dependent on anything else.
Third, the accumulation of power is infinite and varies from time to time. Referring to the second point, it can be said that the accumulation of power today is much greater than 100 years ago. In contrast to Western thought, Javanese thinkers assume that the number of Powers is constant throughout the world. The amount of Power cannot increase or decrease, they can only be concentrated or split. Thus, the collection/concentration of Power in one place automatically reduces Power elsewhere.

Fourth, according to Western thought, power is ambiguous in morality. In Western political thought there is a debate about legitimate power depending on the moral values held. While in Javanese political thought, Power is automatically legitimate, because Power is the moral itself. Thus, the party that acquires Power by itself has legitimacy over its people.

Table 1
Comparison of Power in Western and Javanese Thought
Source: Self Design

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<th>Power</th>
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<td>Character of Power</td>
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Since the source of power does not depend on anything other than power itself, the central issue of Javanese political thought lies not in its use, but on its concentration and maintenance. This has become one of the most important characteristics in understanding Javanese politics—or further later, specifically, international politics in Javanese perspective.

One of the outstanding characteristics of Javanese political thought is to make kings as center of cosmic power. The king in Javanese culture is microcosmic exponent of the kingdom, which connects the cosmic cosmos with the macrocosmic world (Moertono cited by Ali, 1986: 27). Therefore, integrating Javanese political thought into the Study of International Relations needs inclusion of king or state leader as an analytical unit.
The Political Landscape of Asia and Southeast Asia: Past and Contemporary

In examining the political landscape of Asia and Southeast Asia, we can refer to the pre-colonial period. It has been said in several works during colonial times, Southeast Asia is an integral part of China’s tributary system. Southeast Asia is the backwater receiving passively the dominance of great power (Peng Er and Teo, 2012: 2 in Manggala, 2013: 1). Kang (2007, in Manggala, 2013) states that under the order of China, Asia was a stable region until the arrival of the colonial in the 19th century.

This China-centric view is supported by Jacques (2011: 465-468) who states that China is not a conventional nation-state in the Western sense, but the civilisational state whose highest political priority is caring for the unity, cohesion, and integrity of Chinese civilization. The state is regarded as the embodiment, protector, and defender of his civilization. In this context, state and community relationships are in patron-client relationships. China has also developed a tributary system, not a nation-state system, which has the principle of co-existence with other systems of lesser power. This opinion is opposed by Shu (2012, in Manggala 2013) stating that sharp competition for survival and fighting for dominance is the character of this region. Manggala (2013) also states that the area of international relations of Southeast Asia has a complex political structure that inspired the value of mandala.

The contemporary political landscape of Asia is liquid and shows the absence of clear patterns and orders (Shambaugh and Yahuda, 2008: 341). In Asia’s international relations, there is no single integrated “regional system” that makes its political architecture multilayered. There is no agreement from actors (states) that became the code of ethics of their relationship. It is interesting to note that the region has no conceptual unity if combined, but the still it produces order even though has not yet able called as “system”.

In this region, United States—albeit considered to be declining in power and influence—still plays a major role in this region accompanied by the dynamics of major power such as China, India and Japan. These major powers develop their own pattern of relationships that combines competition and cooperation at the same time. This pattern is well represented by the expression of Chinese
scholars, “one superpowers, many powers” (yichao, duo qiang).

US superiority can be seen from the reluctance of major powers—including China—to challenge its hegemony. China deliberately and consciously avoids open and direct confrontation with the United States. China continues to set the road to building cooperation with its Asian neighbors while maintaining good relations with the United States. The major powers of Asia-China, India, Japan, Russia-do not even combine the power to offset US power for three reasons. First, all four require the United States and cannot alienate Washington. Second, they have distrust each other. Third, all three are spoiled by the existing order.

India and China, in this context, are also the same: engaging in cooperative relationships as well as competition. The relationship between the two is an uneasy relationship. India's modality: its size, contribution to world civilization, and its independent foreign policy tradition, made it impossible to coalesce with China (Shambaugh and Yahuda, 2008: 348). As a subsystem, both develop different systems. China once established the traditional hierarchy of Sinic, or Sinocentric (commonly called tributary system) that shadowed Asia and is now entering its fourth wave in history. While India built an Indic system that stretches from the 4th to the 18th centuries and survives in modern South Asia consisting of 6 countries.

Many worry that China is building a new version of this ancient hierarchical hegemonic system through some of its policies. It is said that the vision of 21st New Maritime Silk Road or One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative introduced by President Xi Jinping in 2013 is a contemporary interpretation of this ambition 2017. India—and Japan—are seen adopting internal and external policies for balancing against China. Domestically they build up their military power, and along with it they strengthen military cooperation with US. India did not remain silent, responded it by Act East policy. PM Modi’s Act East policy envisions the people to people, trade, and other relations of India and Asian countries, but in fact it marks India's larger strategic role in Asia-Pacific due to China’s expanding presence in the region and its assertiveness in East Asia maritime territorial dispute (Rajendram, 2014).

Although some Southeast Asian countries adopt counter-China policies with hedging strategies, the majority of ASEAN countries take the opposite
direction. Most ASEAN countries use what Goh (2008) calls “enmeshment strategy” to attract not only China in the intraregional network of mechanisms, but also drags other major power in the regional order. ASEAN countries try not to get caught in major power struggle by building a concert of power to rebalancing the comprehensive distribution of power capabilities between these forces. This strategy of international relations in Southeast Asia seems to conform the mandala logic of anarchy rooted in regional ideas and culture and focus on cooperation rather than competition.

Indonesian Maritime Orientation: Continuity and Dissonance

The election of Joko Widodo (commonly recognised as Jokowi) in 2014 as the 7th Indonesian president marks a major change in the Indonesian policy orientation. From the Phinisi Ship at Sunda Kelapa Harbor on July 22, 2014, Joko Widodo—shortly after declaration of his victory in the presidential election—released his enormous ambition of making Indonesia as “World Maritime Axis”. In addition to this national political stage, Indonesia’s land-based orientation changes to the maritime were also expressed at two international forums, APEC CEO Summit in Beijing, China (10/11/2014) and the 9th East Asia Summit in Myanmar (13/11/2014).

The change in maritime orientation is summarized in five pillars: 1) development of maritime culture, 2) maintenance and management of marine resources with a focus on food security through the fishery industry, 3) priority on infrastructure development and maritime connectivity by building sea tolls, deep seaports, logistics, ship industry, and maritime industry, 4) maritime diplomacy, and 5) maritime defense (Antara News Online, 2014). Not only marking a shift in the direction of foreign policy, this new doctrine also reflects the expansion of Indonesia’s influence from ASEAN-centered to the Indo-Pacific region with a broader focus on trade, infrastructure, and the role of Indonesia in the global and regional arena (The Jakarta Post, 2017).


In 2011 when India became chairman, IORA added 6 priority agenda:
1) Maritime safety and security, 2) Trade and investment facilitation, 3) Fisheries management and sustainable of harvesting Maring Food Resources, 4) Disaster Risk Reduction, 5) Academic and S & T Cooperation, and 6) Tourism Promotion and Cultural Exchanges that marks the expansion of the agenda from mere trade into maritime and environmental security (Agastia and Perwita, 2010). The IORA agenda has much in common with the Indonesian agenda in Indian Ocean, especially maritime security and economic interests in the pillars of Jokowi’s Maritime Axis (Agastia and Perwita, 2014).

Despite its status as archipelagic country, Indonesia is dominantly using land-based view in its foreign and defense policy. Susanto (2015) charts the evolution of Indonesia's maritime strategy in three stages: 1) Shifting from the Indonesia Raya conception to the Indonesian Archipelago, 2) Development of the Archipelagic Document into Wawasan Nusantara (Insight of the Archipelago), 3) Maritime Reorientation. The first and second stages still reflect a land-based view, of which Susanto called “territorialisation of maritime”. The third stage marks an attempt to reverse the way of maritime-based view or “maritimisation of territory”.

It is commonly believed, Jokowi is considered as a pioneer of Indonesian maritime re-orientation. However, the third stage of the evolution of maritime strategy that coincided with the period of reform (after fall of Soeharto, 1998) actually recorded Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), the 4th president, already has a maritime vision by forming the Department of Marine Exploration which later changed into the Department of Marine and Fisheries (DKP) as a ministry authorized to manage the maritime field. After establishing the Department of Marine Exploration, President Wahid also established the National Maritime Council as a marine public policy consultative body headed by the president, chaired daily by the DKP Minister with 10 related ministers as members.

Although it seems only in the reform era Indonesia has a maritime vision, in fact it is not entirely true. In Soekarno’s office, and not in Soeharto’s, Indonesia was the second strongest maritime power in Asia. Sukarno also incorporated maritime aspects in his geopolitical considerations and conveyed his maritime visions of an independent Indonesia in his speeches though still
referring to the classical conception of the archipelago, in contrast to the 1957 Declaration of the Djuanda (Susanto, 2015: 18).

At the time of preparation for Indonesian independence, Soekarno, the father of the nation as well as the first president of Indonesia initiated the concept of Indonesia Raya inherited the territorial lands of Majapahit and Sriwijaya. This idea is a way of view of the expansionist Nusantara character so that the neighboring country is concerned. But the situation of independence only allowed this notion to materialize only in the smaller territory of the East Indies legacy, which became the territory of Indonesia today.

What is the continuity of Indonesia's maritime strategy is that despite its shifting and changing, Indonesia's maritime strategy in the course of time generally consistently defines itself as an archipelagic state and maintains an archipelagist position in the formulation of marine general policy (Susanto, 2015: 37). Another continuity is that Indonesian maritime policy is largely enacted from a land-based territorial orientation. Land orientation becomes dominant due to a combination of historical factors (such as territorial consolidation) and geopolitical areas. The experience of guerilla warfare also creates a vision of Indonesian inward-looking territorial mastery. This posture also continued in Soeharto's New Order period when the TNI focused more on internal security such as separatism and domestic violence and maintaining national stability. The projection of forces by sea is not Indonesia’s priority in the last decade.

Suharto, the second president of Indonesia, despite of his effort developing an archipelagic worldview as geopolitical insight, has built the power of the sea to secure the territory internally and not to build it for external influences such as post-modernisation China built deterrent effect through the forces of the sea. New Order Indonesia’s claim to larger boundaries through the Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone can actually be a rationale to build an outward-looking maritime orientation. But instead of changing the worldview outward, Indonesian maritime strategy in the New Order era to respond to two maritime claims is only for economic development and is defensive externally.

What constitutes dissonance or discontinuity in the evolution of maritime strategy arises from the tendency to
discontinue land-based “territorialisation of maritime” perspective. The weakness tendency of Orde Reformasi in the systematization and consolidation of maritime strategy which is reflected in their vague and scattered Post-1998 maritime initiative is understandable for it is still seeking for form. However, Orde Reformasi Indonesia’s is sporadically attempting towards maritimisation of territory.

**Indo-Pacific Mandala and Jokowi’s Maritime Strategy**

The Indonesian Maritime Doctrine of the Jokowi period through the “Maritime Axis” made Indonesia expand its influence from Southeast Asia to Indo-Pacific. This maritime reorientation is a response to the increased significance of the geostrategic Indian Ocean Rim. Gindarsah (2014) notes that major power, such as India and China, in this region will be more involved in strategic competition than cooperation.

Although the center of the global mandala is still held by the US, but the Indo-Pacific region also raises its own mandala. In the mandala circle of this region, at least China and India are worth anticipating as candidates for the new mandala center fighting for their vassal polity influence. These three major power mutual suspicions constitute the top five military power making the Indian Ocean the location for the greatest military spenders (Rumley, 2013, in Agistia and Perwita).

In the framework of rebalancing strategies, the US released the “Pivot to Asia” doctrine to confirm its political presence in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) in order to strengthen its political and economic commitment in the region (Clinton, 2011 in Agistia). China with its growing military power, increased aggressiveness and economic strength also marks its presence in the region. The Navy China PLA ensures their presence in the South China Sea around the disputed territories of Malaysia and the Philippines. China builds “string of pearls” which later turns into OBOR. India, meanwhile, is in the midst of the battle of both great powers above and seeks also to expand influence on Indian Ocean. Modi’s Act of East policy is an attempt to respond to this. The three major power positions itself as the central mandala and seeks to concentrate the cosmic forces resulting in stability.

However, Indonesia’s efforts to expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific region can also be interpreted as an attempt to become a regional player and a
mandala center in subregion. The application of Java model power can be done in a hard, soft way, or blend of both. The adoption of an offensive strategy, in the sense of the use of military offensives against the enemy, is a rough way. In Javanese political thought, hardness implies weakness and has a counter productive effect on power concentration efforts. Instead of increasing the power, the use of violence against the enemy is prone to be exploited by a third party to “absorb” the power of the party being attacked. Conversely, subtlety in behavior shows the magnitude of power. This subtlety is manifested in the form of dialogue, diplomatic pressure, and all other subtle ways, which stem from the recognition of the superiority and power of one country. This method is also referred to as absorption. According to Anderson, absorption is defined as the voluntary surrender of the neighboring state to the supreme power of the ruler (Anderson, 2006: 45). One main concept that the author wants to convey here is absorption politics. As mentioned above, Javanese political thought emphasizes stability and security, which depend heavily on the concentration of Power. If the concentration of Power is complete, then domestic confusion can be overcome and threats from abroad can be absorbed into.

In the second property, symmetry, Indonesia should be able to cautiously read the geopolitical conditions of the region with competing major powers of US, China and India. However, in the Indonesian marine national policy document, the effort to translate the Jokowi Maritime Poros remains unclear: whether the core internal focus is to maintain domestic resilience focusing on infrastructure development for logistics such as sea tolls, or involving in external protection in the Indian Ocean by joining in the mega-project of the China’s Silk Road or India’s Act East. If it is a center, then Indonesia should carefully read the situation and adjust its strategy to maintain order and security within the mandala.

So far, the cardinal points that serves to define, maintain, and reconfigure symmetry in Jokowi’s office is more on trading and lacking in security. Yet both points play an important role in shaping and reconfiguring the regional political landscape. To conclude, Jokowi’s maritime strategy still lack of systematic and measurable policy to understand its maritime doctrine.
Conclusion

This paper shows above that the regional political architecture and Indonesia’s response can be analysed using the concept of mandala. Indonesia’s strategic cross road position in Indo-Pacific makes it as a potential strategic partner for major powers such as India and China. The Asian political landscape, which in realist view, has been multi-layered and does not have a clear and coherent pattern that produce regularity like a “system”, can actually be more clearly analysed through the concept of mandala. The existing political landscape of the Indo-Pacific region and two emerging mandalas, China and India, can be explained by applying three mandala properties: center, symmetry, and cardinal points. Both are positioning themselves as centers that must adapt to US global influence which manage to continue maintaining their political and military presence through Pivot to Asia doctrine. The adjustment tactics of China and India can be seen from its Maritime Silk Road-OBOR strategy while India through Modi’s Act East. Both still rely on the old cardinal point: security and trade.

The majority of ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, respond through the realist enmeshment strategy. This pacifist strategy is based on cooperative approach because just like Javanese values, Asian cultural memories assume the hard way is not the initial option because it will actually make the other party absorb the power of attacked party. Indonesia's response to the political configuration of the region through maritime reorientation can also be explained through the concept of mandala. The modern Indonesian Maritime Strategy from time to time has continuity in two ways. First, Indonesia is an archipelagic country, and maintains archipelagist status. Second, pre-existing strategies are closer to a land-based “territorialisation of maritime” policy. Jokowi’s maritime strategy in the World Maritime Axis doctrine which tends to adopt maritimization of territorial perspective in mandala’s lens is politics of absorption to respond the changing regional political landscape. Jokowi's adjustment to the changing environment is through the reconfiguration of three cardinal points: security, economy, identity. In sum, Jokowi's maritime strategy still lacks explanatory documents that systematically and clearly guide its practices.
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